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Tax Tattletales Hit the Jackpot: Now What?
Sharon Kaur*
Abstract
This note examines the recent change to the Internal Revenue Service’s
(IRS) whistleblower program. Whistleblowers receive a percentage of the
proceeds collected as a result of an action or settlement. In 2018, Congress
expanded the definition of the proceeds collected to include criminal fines,
civil forfeitures, and penalties arising out of the violations of reporting
requirements. Prior to this change, the IRS asserted that criminal fines and
civil forfeitures did not constitute “collected proceeds.” Analyzing the
judicial and legislative history, along with empirical data reported by the
IRS, this note specifically addresses whether the change in the definition of
proceeds advances the objectives of the tax whistleblower program and
promotes good tax policy.

I. INTRODUCTION
“It takes many good deeds to build a good reputation, and only one
bad one to lose it.”1 These famous words by Benjamin Franklin resonate with
employees who blow the whistle and employers who engage in deceptive
activities. In 1772, when Franklin exposed letters promoting abridgement of
colonists’ rights from then-governor of Massachusetts Thomas Hutchinson,
’unbeknownst to him, he became the first ever American Whistleblower.2
His conduct opened the floodgates for major political and economic scandals
in the nation. The Watergate scandal, the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and the
* J.D. Candidate 2021, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I would
like to thank Professor Heather Field for her guidance and advice. This note would not have
been possible without her extensive feedback throughout the writing process. I would also
like to thank my family, especially my parents, for their love, support, and encouragement.
1. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Reputation, Information and the Organization of the
Judiciary, 4 J. COMPARATIVE L. 228, 228 (2009).
2. Anthony F. Fata & David E. Kovel, The New Regulatory and Self-Policing Paradigm:
Whistleblowers Among Us, 32 CBA REC. 36, 37 (2018).
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recent global surveillance disclosures are some of the most shocking
revelations that come to mind.
Referred to as rats, villains, snitches, and occasionally heroes,
whistleblowers tend to believe that public interest outweighs professional
duties and “blow the whistle” on fraudulent activities.3 Most whistleblowers
are employees who report misconduct believing that it is the right action to
take, it will correct a wrong, or it will support co-workers.4 These individuals
are usually at the core of the business.5 They possess the specific and
necessary knowledge to enable the commencement of an enforcement action
against fraudulent businesses.6 To put this into perspective, consider the
following scenario:
Sam is a bookkeeper. She discovers that her employer, Jack,
is engaged in embezzlement, false recordkeeping, and is
hiding assets overseas. Jack owns a multi-million dollar
business that engages in domestic and foreign transactions.
Sam is not involved in these fraudulent activities. After
pondering over this revelation for several days, she decides
to tip off the IRS and discloses information about Jack’s
suspicious activities. She mails copies of his fabricated bank
statements and recordkeeping documents to the IRS. But, in
the interim, she continues to work for him as a bookkeeper.
While most will call Sam a snitch, others might admire her for risking her
career for social welfare. If Sam’s allegations are credible, she might become
a recipient of a whistleblower award paid out of the proceeds that the IRS
collects from Jack. But how big should Sam’s award be? And more
specifically, what should count as “proceeds” for purposes of determining
the size of Sam’s whistleblower award?
Before 2018, the IRS asserted that only the proceeds collected under
Title 26, which focuses on the violations of federal tax laws, may be used to
calculate a whistleblower’s award.7 Criminal fines and civil forfeitures were

3. Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and the Courts
Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing of
Employers, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316, 316 (1993); see also RALPH NADER ET
AL., WHISTLEBLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
VII (1972).
4. ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER, INSIDE THE MIND OF A WHISTLEBLOWER: A SUPPLEMENTAL
REPORT
OF
THE
2011
NATIONAL
BUSINESS
ETHICS
SURVEY (2012),
http://www.corporatecompliance-insights.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/inside-themind-of-a-whistleblower-NBES.pdf.
5. Fata & Kovel, supra note 2, at 38.
6. Id.
7. Whistleblower 21276-13W v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. 121, 126 (2016) [hereinafter
Whistleblower II].
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not considered collected proceeds for the awards paid under Title 26.8 Civil
forfeitures are enforced on property used for illegal purposes, while criminal
fines are enforced against the taxpayer for engaging in fraudulent conduct.9
The IRS claimed that including criminal fines and civil forfeitures under
Title 26 would conflict with Title 31 and Title 18.10 While Title 26 codifies
federal tax laws, such as income, estate, excise, gift, tobacco, employment,
and alcohol taxes, Title 31 codifies anti-money laundering laws and Title 18
relates to crimes and criminal procedure.11 However, after Congress changed
the law in 2018, the IRS started to include both Title 26 and non-Title 26
criminal fines and civil forfeitures in the proceeds collected for the purposes
of determining a whistleblower’s award.
In the above hypothetical, Sam’s award will be paid out of the total
proceeds that the IRS will collect from Jack. These proceeds will include
Jack’s penalty for the underpayment of tax, along with a criminal fine for the
tax deficiency that resulted from his fraudulent conduct.12 It will also include
civil forfeitures with respect to any property that was used to commit the
illegal activities.13 Pre-2018, Sam would have received an award calculated
based on the penalty for the underpayment of tax per Title 26 (i.e., excluding
non-Title 26 criminal fines and civil forfeitures). Now, post-2018, her award
will be a portion of the total proceeds (i.e., including criminal fines and civil
forfeitures). This raises a question: does the post-2018 broadened definition
of proceeds collected, including criminal fines and civil forfeitures under
both Title 26 and non-Title 26, increase the efficacy of the IRS whistleblower
program and advance good tax policy?
By increasing the sum of awards paid out to whistleblowers, the
broad interpretation of proceeds encourages more whistleblowers to disclose
information about noncompliance. This facilitates the IRS enforcement
efforts in detecting noncompliant taxpayers, thereby closing the tax gap and
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 11, 12 and accompanying text.
10. Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. at 126.
11. United States Census Bureau, TITLE 26, U.S. CODE, CENSUS.GOV, (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/privacy_confidentiality/title_26_us_code_1.
html [https://perma.cc/3UQ4-UGMH]; IRS, TITLE 31 ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING, IRS.GOV
(Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/indian-tribal-governments/title-31anti-money-laundering [https://perma.cc/PTR2-YET9]; U.S. Gov’t Publishing Office, 18
U.S.C., GOVINFO.GOV (2009), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2009title18/html/USCODE-2009-title18.htm [https://perma.cc/Z3DW-8QCY].
12. Internal Revenue Service, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUALS PART 9, CHAPTER 5, SECTION
13, IRS.GOV, (2009), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-013 [https://perma.cc/FE6SMB8X].
13. Internal Revenue Service, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUALS PART 9, CHAPTER 7, SECTION
2, IRS.GOV, (2012), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-007-002 [https://perma.cc/V7REWLBG].
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increasing the revenues collected. However, the broad definition of proceeds
does not entirely incentivize individuals with heterogeneous motivations to
disclose information or encourage companies to implement effective internal
reporting mechanisms. To resolve the former issue, the IRS should educate
the public about the benefits of the whistleblower program and publicly
praise whistleblowers as heroes. To address the latter issue, the IRS should
impose penalties on companies with inadequate internal reporting
mechanisms. Fear of legal penalties and negative publicity will prompt these
companies to investigate and rectify tax-related violations.
Part I of this article examines the emergence of whistleblower
programs in general before specifically discussing the IRS whistleblower
program. To better understand the policy implications of recent amendments
to the IRS whistleblower statute, it is essential to consider the origins of the
program, along with the changes in the legislative and judicial history of the
program. Part II then analyzes whether the broad definition of proceeds
advances the objective of the tax whistleblower program and discusses the
policy implications, more generally, of the broadened definition of proceeds.
Part III discusses problems that cannot be resolved by the expanded
definition of proceeds.

II. THE TAX WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM
Whistleblower programs are weapons that are built on the principle
that “if you know something, say something.”14 Today, these programs
incentivize individuals to come forth with any information they might have
on wrongdoings committed by those in their professional or personal circle.
For instance, in response to the stock market collapse in 2010, Congress
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank Act) adding the Securities Whistleblower Incentives and
Protection section to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.15 Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) whistleblowers are awarded somewhere
between ten to thirty percent of the total monetary sanctions that are collected
by the Commission depending on the significance of information, degree of
assistance by the whistleblower, and the Commission’s interest in deterring
the violation.16 The SEC established the whistleblower program to encourage
individuals to report high-quality tips and assist the Commission in detecting

14. Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. at 123–24.
15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o); Michael H. Hurwitz & Jonathan
Kovacs, An Overview of the SEC’s Whistleblower Award Program, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 531, 533 (2016).
16. Id. at 535.
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any wrongdoing.17 Similar programs have been established by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), and Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).18
The main purpose of whistleblower programs is to “enlist private
interests into the fight against serious threats to the U.S. economy.”19 By
merging economic incentives with protective measures against retaliation,
these programs foster an environment that encourages individuals with
knowledge of fraudulent activities to come forward without having to report
violations to their employer’s internal compliance system.20 These
safeguards also protect persons other than employees, such as clients,
competitors, and investors, who may disclose illegal activities.21 In addition
to deterring illegal activities and exposing otherwise concealed violations,
this external reporting to whistleblower programs has the potential to
improve self-reporting done by organizations themselves.22 To prevent
whistleblowers from “blowing the whistle” on their misconduct, companies
are likely to feel pressured to voluntarily disclose their activities.23
Whistleblowers reduce regulatory costs by encouraging legal compliance.24
Because financial activities that have increasingly been taking place are
beyond regulators’ expertise, whistleblowers help regulators to anticipate
and detect any financial misconduct.25
One of the most prominent whistleblower programs was established
by the IRS. The following sections examine the IRS whistleblower program,
17. United States SEC, SEC PROPOSES WHISTLEBLOWER RULE AMENDMENTS, SEC.GOV,
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-120 [https://perma.cc/G7VY-8S7M].
18. See, e.g., United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC LAUNCHES
WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM’S
WEBSITE,
CFTC.GOV,
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7312-16 [https://perma.cc/9YYZ-JQQQ];
Richard E. Condit, Providing Environmental Whistleblowers with Twenty-First Century
Protections, 2 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 31, 55–56 (2011).
19. Christopher K. Warren, Blowing the Whistle on Environmental Law: How Congress
Can Help the EPA Enlist Private Resources in the Fight to Save the Planet, 40 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 195, 197 (2015).
20. Warren, supra note 19, at 197; Joel Androphy & Kathryn Nelson, The Intersection of
the Dodd-Frank Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: What All Practitioners,
Whistleblowers, Defendants, and Corporations Need to Know, in 59 THE ADVOCATE:
LITIGATION SECTION OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS 19, 24 (Lonny Hoffman ed., 2012).
21. Warren, supra note 19, at 198–205.
22. Amy Deen Westbrook, Cash for Your Conscience: Do Whistleblower Incentives
Improve Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 75 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1097,
1106 (2018).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Christina Parajon Skinner, Whistleblowers and Financial Innovation, 94 N.C. L. REV.
861, 867, 879–80 (2016).
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which has become a substantial source of revenue for the federal
government. Section A looks at the origins of the tax whistleblower laws.
Section B provides a brief description of the claim filing process. Section C
analyzes the growth of the program based on the proceeds collected and the
amounts awarded. Section D focuses on the different interpretations of the
term “proceeds” over the past few decades.
A. Tax Whistleblower Statutes
The tax whistleblower program was established to reward
individuals who inform on taxpayers engaged in tax fraud. The primary
purpose of this program is to reduce the tax gap and adequately motivate
whistleblowers to disclose information.26 The IRS defines a whistleblower
as an “individual who provides information to the [agency] regarding
violations of the tax laws or related statutes and submits a claim for an award
under Section 7623 with respect to the information.”27 These whistleblowers
have emerged as an important tool for the IRS.28 The IRS has attempted to
implement technological mechanisms to detect fraudulent returns.29
However, due to the immense pressure to increase revenue and “administer
new tax credits with fewer resources,” the IRS has to rely on “enforcement
personnel and information leverage.”30 A whistleblower acts as a substitute
for “enforcement personnel by identifying wrongdoing and by providing a
roadmap for prosecution.”31 Thus, the IRS employs its whistleblower
program as a tool to deter tax fraud in a cost-effective manner.32
The following parts explain the development in the tax
whistleblower statute in a chronological manner. Part 1 describes the original
tax whistleblower statute. Part 2 examines the provision that was added to
further enhance the whistleblower program.
1. Establishment of the Tax Whistleblower Law
The tax whistleblower statute, IRC section 7623(a), dates back to
1867.33 This original provision permitted the Secretary to award sums as
26. Stephen W. Carman, More Cheese for the Rats: Tax Court and Congress Give Big Win
to Whistleblowers with Broad Definition of Proceeds, 83 MO. L. REV. 155, 169 (2018).
27. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(n)-2 (2011).
28. Karie Davis-Nozemack & Sarah J. Webber, Lost Opportunities: The Underuse of Tax
Whistleblowers, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 321, 326 (2015).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 324, 326.
31. Id. at 327.
32. Yehonatan Givati, Of Snitches and Riches: Optimal IRS and SEC Whistleblower
Rewards, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 105, 123 (2017).
33. IRS, History of the Whistleblower/Informant Program (May 1, 2019),
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/history-of-the-whilstleblower-informant-program;
Jay
Nanavati, The IRS Whistleblower Regulations: A Hindrance to Tax Enforcement, THE CPA J.
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deemed necessary “for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment
persons guilty of violating the internal revenues or conniving at the same.”34
The only change to this law since 1867 has been the addition of another
clause, allowing awards to be distributed specifically for “detecting
underpayments of tax,” in 1996.35 The IRS originally made payments out of
its appropriated funds; however, after the 1996 amendments, the source of
funds was changed to the “proceeds collected from the taxpayer.”36 Issuance
of awards was completely discretionary prior to the 2006 amendments.37 The
awards were calculated based on the contribution of the whistleblower’s
information to the collection of proceeds.38 Awards were generally one, ten,
or fifteen percent of the total proceeds, not exceeding $10 million.39
2. Mandatory Award for Disclosures
As part of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act in 2006, Congress
added the IRC section 7623(b), which required the IRS to award “at least 15
percent but not more than 30 percent of the proceeds collected as a result of
the action (including any related actions40)” if an individual “substantially”
contributed to the collection of “tax, penalties, interest, and other amounts”
when the proceeds in dispute exceed $2 million.41 This provision applies to
any action against a taxpayer, including any individual with gross income of
more than $200,000 for the taxable years subject to the action.42 Awards are
mandatory if these conditions are met. Whistleblowers who do not qualify
for the IRC section 7623(b) may still be eligible for an award under Section
(Dec. 2018), https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/12/18/the-irs-whistleblower-regulations/
(discussing how the original creation of tax whistleblower statute about 153 years ago was
codified and added to the Internal Revenue Code as section 7623(a)).
34. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a) (2019); IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2008 ANNUAL
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
2
(2008),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/whistleblower_annual_report.pdf.
35. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a) (2019); Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat.
1473 (1996).
36. IRS, Whistleblower Program First Report to Congress 2 (2008),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2008.pdf.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See infra note 104. The proposed regulations limited “related action” to a
subsequent/second action against the person identified in the original information. An action
against any other person is permitted if the other person is directly related to the person
identified in the information, facts relate to the tax underpayments or the IRC violations that
are similar to those described in the information, and the IRS has initiated an action against
the other person based on facts provided.
41. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2019); IRS, Whistleblower Program First Report to Congress 2
(2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2008.pdf.
42. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2019).
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7623(a).43 Nevertheless, Congress added the new provision because the
whistleblower program was underused “due to administrative problems and
inadequate incentives for whistleblowers.”44 The whistleblower program
was considered to be capable of producing more revenue. This new provision
became applicable to whistleblower claims filed after the enactment date of
December 20, 2006.45 The enactment of Section 7623(b) has altered the
whistleblower claims process as discussed in the following section.
B. Filing a Tax Whistleblower Claim with the IRS
The IRC section 7623(b) was enacted to encourage more
whistleblowers to file claims. However, prior to filing a claim, an informant
needs to be aware of certain requirements. Informants, also known as
claimants, must disclose their identities; anonymous claims are not
processed.46 The claim must be filed by a person who is actually an
individual, not a corporation or partnership.47 A claim filed by an individual
who is an employee of the federal, state or local government, or who is
required by law to disclose information is not processed under the IRC
sections 7623(a) and 7623(b).48 These individuals, along with any business
entities, are not eligible for whistleblower tax awards.49 Most importantly,
claims without specific and credible information are deemed meritless and
are denied.50
To file a tax whistleblower claim, an individual must first submit the
IRS Form 211 (“Application for Award for Original Information”) to the IRS
Whistleblower Office (WO).51 This form is separated into two sections.
Section A asks questions about the taxpayer subject to the whistleblower
claim (name, address, identification number, date of birth, etc.), type of
unpaid tax, description of alleged violation, how the claimant learned of the
violation, and an estimate of tax owed.52 Section B requests information

43. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a) (2019).
44. Carman, supra note 26, at 159.
45. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922 (2006);
IRS, IRC 7623(b) (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/compliance/internal-revenue-codeirc-7623b.
46. IRS, How do you File a Whistleblower Award Claim Under Section 7623(a) or (b)
(Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/compliance/how-do-you-file-a-whistleblower-awardclaim-under-section-7623-a-or-b.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Form 211, Application for Award for Original Information, 1 (2018).
52. Form 211, Instructions for Form 211, Application for Award for Original Information,
2 (2018).

Summer 2021]

TAX TATTLETALES HIT THE JACKPOT

97

about the claimant (name, address, date of birth, social security number, etc.)
and requires the claimant to sign under the penalty of perjury.53
The initial phase of the claim process can be divided into two steps.
First, the WO’s Initial Claim Evaluation unit examines the claims for
completion and submits the information into a management information
system known as E-Trak.54 Claims that are purely speculative with no
specific or credible issues, are ineligible for an award, or are missing
information are rejected.55 The WO conducts this initial review within thirty
to ninety days.56 The IRC section 7623(b) claims that are rejected have an
administrative proceeding and can be petitioned to the tax court.57 Second,
the WO routes claims warranting further review to the appropriate operating
division (OD) – Large Business and International, Small Business/SelfEmployed, Tax Exempt and Government Entities, or Criminal
Investigation.58 The OD subject matter expert (SME) evaluates the claim and
determines its potential for an IRS action.59 If the OD SME determines the
claim to be an IRC section 7623(b) claim with more than $2 million of
proceeds in dispute, then it is assigned to the Case Development and
Oversight unit for review.60 These review steps are designed to be completed
in ninety days, but only about sixty-seven percent of the IRC section 7623(b)
claims are processed during this period.61 Once the claim has been selected
for an audit or an enforcement proceeding (i.e., a collections action or a
criminal investigation), it moves to the field examination and appeals phase
that may lag over several years.62 During this period, whistleblowers may be
interviewed once by the IRS, but other than that interaction, they will not
receive any information about the investigation until a decision has been
made about the claim.63

53. Id.
54. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-20, IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM:
BILLIONS COLLECTED, BUT TIMELINESS AND COMMUNICATION CONCERNS MAY DISCOURAGE
WHISTLEBLOWERS 8 (2015) (noting that the E-Trak follows the progress of claims throughout
the review process) [hereinafter GAO-16-20].
55. IRS,
THE
WHISTLEBLOWER
CLAIM
PROCESS,
PUB.
NO.
5251,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5251.pdf.; GAO-16-20, supra note 54, at 8.
56. IRS,
THE
WHISTLEBLOWER
CLAIM
PROCESS,
PUB.
NO.
5251,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5251.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Id.; see also GAO-16-20, supra note 54, at 3, 8–10.
59. GAO-16-20, supra note 54, at 10.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id. at 9.
62. Id. at 10; IRS, THE WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIM PROCESS, PUB. NO. 5251,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5251.pdf.
63. IRS,
THE
WHISTLEBLOWER
CLAIM
PROCESS,
PUB.
NO.
5251,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5251.pdf.
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After the examination and appeals period is over, the WO
determines the award percentage based on the information contributed by the
whistleblower.64 The minimum award is set at fifteen percent, and the WO
uses positive factors to decide whether the award percentage should be
raised, with the maximum set at thirty percent.65 Positive factors may include
the whistleblower’s promptness in informing the IRS, clarity of facts, and
originality of the claim.66 However, the WO also considers negative factors,
such as delay in reaching out to the IRS, violation of any confidentiality
agreement with the IRS, and conveyance of misleading information, to
determine whether the award should be decreased.67 If the whistleblower was
involved in the malfeasance that led to the underpayment of tax or was not
the original source of specific allegations, then the maximum percentage of
the award is ten percent.68 An individual is not the original source of specific
allegations if they arise from an earlier administrative or judicial hearing,
government audit, report, hearing or investigation, or news.69 Moreover, the
WO must deny an award to a claimant who is criminally convicted for
initiating actions that led to the underpayment of tax or another violation of
IRS laws.70
Once the right to appeal for the taxpayer against whom the whistle
was blown (targeted taxpayer) expires, the collected proceeds are finalized,
and the WO applies the calculated percentage to collected proceeds.71 Upon
the receipt of this preliminary award, a whistleblower has the option to
appeal if there is any disagreement over the amount awarded.72 If the targeted
taxpayer does not pay the enforced fines and penalties, the WO has to wait
for the ten-year collection statute to expire before making any other decision
about the award.73 If the taxpayer does not make any payment, the
whistleblower receives no award.74

64. GAO-16-20, supra note 54, at 10.
65. Id. at 25.
66. Bryan C. Skarlatos & Joseph Septimus, New Proposed Regulations Flesh Out IRS
Whistleblower Program, 14 J. TAX PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 21, 23 (2012).
67. Id.
68. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(2)(A) (2019); GAO-16-20, supra note 54, at 25; IRS,
WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM
FIRST
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
3–4
(2008),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2008.pdf.
69. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(2)(A) (2019).
70. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(3) (2019).
71. GAO-16-20, supra note 54, at 14.
72. Id.
73. IRS, THE WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIM PROCESS, PUB. NO. 5251 (Oct. 2019),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5251.pdf.
74. Id.
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C. Growth of Tax Whistleblower Awards
The WO’s claims process spans over many years, with no guarantee
of an award. Yet, with the implementation of the IRC section 7623(b) in
2006, submissions from whistleblowers started “almost immediately” and
2007 became a year of transition for the whistleblower program.75 Although
data regarding the whistleblower claims that “would have qualified for the
mandatory awards” under Section 7623(b) prior to its enactment are
unavailable, “initial results suggest that whistleblowers with significant
knowledge were coming forward as a result of the changes to the award
program.”76
The following table reflects the amount of proceeds collected and
amount of proceeds paid as awards over the past sixteen years.77 The awards
paid out in the earlier Fiscal Years (FY) 2007 through 2010 were based on
the IRC section 7623(a) with lower percentages.78 The IRS does not issue
awards until the targeted taxpayer exhausts “all appeal rights and the
statutory period for the filling of a claim for refund” expires.79 Due to this
delay in the process, the awards under Section 7623(b) were not paid until
FY 2011.80 Even then, most of the awards paid were from claims filed under
Section 7623(a). Note Section 7623(b) only applies to claims that were filed
after December 20, 2006.81

75. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FIRST REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2008),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2008.pdf. Note section 406(c) of Tax Relief and
Health Care Act of 2006 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to report to Congress on the
use of Section 7623 annually.
76. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 1 (2008),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2009.pdf.
77. Id. at 10; IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
17 (2012),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2013.pdf; IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM FY 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 11 (2015),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2016.pdf; IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY
2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 10 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241-2017.pdf; IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 8
(2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2020.pdf.
78. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 15
(2011), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2012.pdf.
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id.
81. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Table 1: Awards Collected and Awards Paid, Fiscal Years 2004-201982
Year
Award
Paid*

Number Amounts
Amount of Awards Paid
of
Collected
Awards
Paid
2004
259
$74,130,794
$4,585,143
2005
169
$93,677,606
$7,602,685
2006
220
$258,590,435
$24,184,458
2007
227
$181,784,287
$13,600,205
2008
198
$155,985,834
$22,370,756
2009
110
$206,032,872
$5,851,608
2010
97
$464,695,459
$18,746,327
2011
97
$48,047,500
$8,008,430
2012
128
$592,498,294
$125,355,799
2013
133
$343,674,315
$54,054,587
2014
101
$309,990,568
$52,281,628
2015
99
$501,317,481
$103,486,677
2016
418
$368,907,298
$61,390,910
2017
242
$190,583,750
$33,979,873
2018
217
$1,441,255,859 $312,207,590
2019
181
$616,773,127
$120,305,278
*The IRS generally does not complete the claim process in the same
year it was filed; there is no correlation between the claim
submission year and the award paid year.83 For example, hundreds
of claims filed in 2007 are still open.84
The 2006 legislative change was not the only change to Section
7623(b) during the years listed in Table 1. As will be discussed later in Part
I.D.2, Congress enacted another change in 2018, and the 2018 change
expanded the definition of the term “proceeds” for purposes of determining
the amount of whistleblower awards.85 Table 1 does not, however, fully
capture the impact of that change because, as discussed above, awards are
not paid out in the same year that claims are filed.86 Table 2 below does not
indicate any significant increase in the total claim submissions over the past

82 See sources cited supra note 77.
83. See infra Part II.B on the claims process.
84. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 15 (2019),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2020.pdf.
85. See infra note 123.
86. See infra Part II.B on the claims process.
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few years.87 There is an incremental change of 3.25 percent from 2017 to
2018 followed by a decline of 3.43 percent in 2019 with respect to claim
submissions. Notwithstanding any political or economic changes, the
fluctuating data demonstrate that the new definition of proceeds may not
have incentivized claimants (any more than usual) to file a claim. On the
other hand, the changes made to the definition of proceeds apply to
information with respect to any claim for which a final determination of
award has not been made before February 9, 2018,88 therefore, the awards
paid out in fiscal years 2018 and 2019 reflect the inclusion of criminal fines
and civil forfeitures in proceeds collected. Even though the number of
awards paid have decreased to 217 and 181 during their respective fiscal
years, 2018 and 2019, the amount of proceeds paid out in awards has
increased, as shown in Table 1. Therefore, the broader definition of proceeds
has increased the awards paid out in the most recent fiscal years.
Table 2: Fiscal Years 2017-2019 Claim Submissions89
Year
IRC
Section IRC
Section Total
Claim
7623(a) claims*
7623(b) claims
Submissions
2017
4,157
271
4,428
2018
4,188
384
4,572
2019
4,046
369
4,415
*If a claim does not meet the IRC section 7623(b) requirements, the
WO can review it for an award under the discretionary standard of
the IRC section 7623(a).90
Another reason why the amounts collected and amounts paid only
reflected taxes, penalties, interests and additional amounts collected based
on the whistleblower information91 prior to 2018 was the Victims of Crime
Act that required all the criminal fines to be deposited into the Victims of
Crime Fund.92 In 2018, the non-Title 26 amounts collected for criminal fines,
87. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (2017),
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports; IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER
OFFICE
ANNUAL
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
11
(2018),
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports; IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER
OFFICE
ANNUAL
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
11
(2019),
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports.
88. See infra note 124.
89. See sources cited supra note 87.
90. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (2019),
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports.
91. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 14 (2012),
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports.
92. 28 C.F.R. § 94 (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIME VICTIMS FUND,
https://www.ovc.gov/about/victimsfund.html. The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 established
the Crime Victims Fund that is funded by the penalties, criminal fines, forfeited bail bonds,
and special assessments collected from federal offenders. In 1993, the initial cap on how much
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civil forfeitures, and violations of reporting requirements added up to
$809,915,922, while the amounts collected under Title 26 was
$631,339,937.93 In 2019, the non-Title 26 amounts collected were much
lower at about $110,003,100, while the Title 26 amounts constituted a much
higher percentage of the total amounts collected at $506,770,027.94 The
addition of non-Title 26 criminal fines and civil forfeitures to collected
proceeds validates the assumption that the broad definition of “proceeds”
significantly impacts the amounts collected and amounts paid for claims that
were not finalized prior to 2018.
D. What Does “Proceeds” Mean?
The monetary award is a major component of the tax whistleblower
policy. Therefore, the following section traces the developments in how
“proceeds collected” has been defined for purposes of determining the
amount of whistleblower awards.
1. Initial Changes to the Definition of “Proceeds Collected”
As explained above in Part I.A.2, Congress’s Taxpayer Bill of
Rights 2, which was passed in 1996, established that rewards may be paid
out for information on criminal and civil violations.95 The bill also clarified
that the rewards were to be paid out of proceeds collected as a result of the
information disclosed, and that an annual report of the program was also
required.96 However, that legislation did not explain how “proceeds
collected” was defined for purposes of determining the amount of
whistleblower awards.
In 2006, the IRS published an Internal Revenue Manual (IRM)
clarifying that tax crimes include violations of criminal statutes of Title 26,
Title 18 and/or Title 31 as applicable to Title 26.97 Despite this guidance
amount can be deposited into the fund was lifted, therefore, all of the penalties and fines
collected were allowed to be deposited to support crime victims. A few years later, in Fiscal
year 2000, Congress limited the amount of funds available for distribution as a precaution to
maintain a stable source of support for victims. Since its inception, the Crime Victims Fund
has accumulated billions of dollars from penalties and fines.
93. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports.
94. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2019),
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/whistleblower-office-annual-reports.
95. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, 104 H.R. 506.; Jeffrey Neiman, Whistleblowers to Get a
Larger Cut of IRS Recouped Taxes, LAW360 EXPERT ANALYSIS (2018),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1029447/whistleblowers-to-get-a-larger-cut-of-irsrecouped-taxes.
96. Neiman, supra note 95.
97. IRM
9.5.3.1
(2006),
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005003#idm140538254164048.
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manual, the IRS commissioner took the position that proceeds only included
amounts collected under Title 26.98
In 2011, the Treasury proposed regulations (“Proposed Regulations
I”) under Section 7623 to define “collected proceeds” as follows:
Tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional
amounts collected by reason of the information provided;
amounts collected prior to receipt of the information if the
information provided results in the denial of a claim for
refund that otherwise would have been paid; and a reduction
of an overpayment credit balance used to satisfy a tax
liability incurred because of the information provided.99
On February 22, 2012, the Proposed Regulations I were finalized largely as
proposed.100 Accordingly, in 2012, the IRS published an IRM modifying the
definition of proceeds to comply with these regulations for the purposes of
applying to the IRC sections 7623(a) and 7623(b).101
On December 28, 2012, the Treasury proposed regulations
(“Proposed Regulations II”) that built on the definition of collected proceeds
specified in the final regulations published earlier in 2012.102 In addition to
restating the definition of proceeds from these final regulations, the Proposed
Regulations II provided that criminal fines deposited into the Victims of
Crime Fund are not part of the “collected proceeds.”103 Comments were
received in response to the Proposed Regulations II requesting the inclusion
of amounts recovered under Title 18 and Title 31 in the proceeds collected
to incentivize whistleblowers to disclose information on violations under

98. Neiman, supra note 95. Critics argue that the exclusion of civil and criminal violations
from collected proceeds undermines IRS’ own directives. The separation of Title 26 from
other titles without basis dissuades informants from exposing fraudulent activities.
99. Rewards and Awards for Information Relating to Violations of Internal Revenue Laws,
76
Fed.
Reg.
2852
(proposed
Jan.
14,
2011),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2011/01/18/2011-928/rewards-and-awards-forinformation-relating-to-violations-of-internal-revenue-laws.
100. Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(g) (2012). pmbl.,
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/02/22/2012-3989/rewards-and-awards-forinformation-relating-to-violations-of-internal-revenue-laws.
101. IRM 25.2.2.13 (2012). Note that the IRS originally interpreted proceeds to be “monies
the IRS obtains directly from a taxpayer which are based upon the information the
whistleblower has provided.
102. Awards for Information Relating to Detecting Underpayments of Tax or Violations of
the Internal Revenue Laws, 77 Fed. Reg. 74798 (proposed Dec. 14, 2012),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/12/18/2012-30512/awards-forinformation-relating-to-detecting-underpayments-of-tax-or-violations-of-the-internal.
103. Id.
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these titles.104 However, when the Proposed Regulations II were finalized on
August 12, 2014, these final regulations provided that non-Title 26 amounts
did not constitute collected proceeds since the language of the IRC section
7623 only permits awards for detecting violations of the IRC and
underpayments of tax.105 The final regulations also provided that the criminal
fines deposited into the Victims of Crime Fund should not be considered
collected proceeds.106
Consistent with the 2012 final regulations, the 2014 final regulation
Section 301.7623-2(d) defined “collected proceeds” as follows:
Tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional
amounts collected because of the information provided;
amounts collected prior to receipt of the information if the
information provided results in the denial of a claim for
refund that otherwise would have been paid; and a reduction
of an overpayment credit balance used to satisfy a tax
liability incurred because of the information provided.
Collected proceeds are limited to amounts collected under
the provisions of title 26, United States Code.107
Because the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 requires the entire sum
of fines collected in criminal tax cases to be deposited into the Victims of
Crime Fund, the Treasury regulations retained the rule requiring these fines
to be deposited into the Victims of Crime Fund.108 These amounts did not
constitute collected proceeds.109 At this point, the definition of collected
proceeds was narrow. It did not include criminal fines and civil forfeitures
that were collected under both Title 26 and non-Title 26 claims. The
regulations providing guidance on information submitted concerning tax
underpayments or violations of the IRC have not changed since 2014.
2. Uproar in the Courtroom: Judiciary Interprets Proceeds
Controversy over the definition of collected proceeds arose in court
cases related to a whistleblower claim originally filed in 2015.110 In the first
104. TREAS.
REG.
§
301.7623-2
(Aug.
14,
2014),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/08/12/2014-18858/awards-forinformation-relating-to-detecting-underpayments-of-tax-or-violations-of-the-internal.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. TREAS. REG. § 301.7623-2(d) (Aug. 14, 2014).
108. See
TREAS.
REG.
§
301.7623-2
(Aug.
14,
2014),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/08/12/2014-18858/awards-forinformation-relating-to-detecting-underpayments-of-tax-or-violations-of-the-internal.
109. Id.
110. Whistleblower 21276-13W v. C.I.R., 144 T.C. 290, 291 (2015) [hereinafter
Whistleblower I].
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case, Whistleblower I, petitioners, husband and wife, helped the Department
of Justice (DOJ) stage a sting operation to get incriminating evidence against
the businesses involved in tax evasion (“targeted businesses”).111 The
targeted businesses were found guilty of conspiring to commit offense and
defraud of the IRS in violation of Title 18.112 A defendant found guilty of an
offense may be required to pay a criminal fine for filing false tax returns,
evading income taxes, and conspiring to defraud the IRS; in this case, the
targeted businesses were sentenced to pay $22,050,000 in criminal fines.113
Civil forfeitures constitute forfeiture of property used in a transaction (i.e.,
money laundering) with the intent to evade taxes or file false tax returns; in
this case, the targeted businesses were sentenced to pay $15,821,000 in civil
forfeitures.114 Overall, the targeted businesses were required to pay over $74
million in tax restitution, criminal fines and civil forfeitures.115 When
petitioners filed Form 211 with the WO seeking awards for their
contributions to the IRS’s investigation, multiple disputes ensued.116
Whistleblower I resolved the first disputed issue, holding that petitioners did
not have to file Form 211 before disclosing information to the IRS to qualify
for an award.117
In 2016, the second case, Whistleblower II, focused on the second
dispute regarding the definition of proceeds. This case posed the question
whether criminal fines and civil forfeitures were part of the collected
proceeds for the purposes of the whistleblower award.118 Reading the words
“collected proceeds” within the context of the statute and interpreting them
by their plain meaning, the court found that criminal fines and civil
forfeitures constituted collected proceeds.119 The court concluded that if
Congress had intended to limit proceeds to Title 26, it would have explicitly
done so.120 The court also pointed out that the IRC itself refers to laws outside
of Title 26.121 By holding that criminal fines and civil forfeitures are
collected proceeds, which are not limited to Title 26, the judiciary introduced
an expansive interpretation of collected proceeds.122

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 293–95.
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2020); Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. 121, 122 (2016).
Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. at 123; 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 3571 (2020).
Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. at 123; 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (2016).
Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. at 123.
Whistleblower I, 144 T.C. at 290.
Whistleblower I, 144 T.C. at 300.
Whistleblower II, 147 T.C. at 123.
Id. at 136, 138.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 136, 138.

106

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32:2

3. Legislative Follows Judicial: Congress Defines Collected Proceeds
On February 9, 2018, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act
(BBA) of 2018, and among many other changes, this law amended the
definition of “proceeds” for purposes of the determination of whistleblower
awards.123 The revised definition, adopted in response to the Whistleblower
I and II litigation and lobbying, defined “proceeds” broadly to not only
include “penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts
provided under the internal revenue laws,” but to also include criminal fines,
civil forfeitures and penalties arising out of the violations of reporting
requirements.124 As a result of the amendments made by the BBA, the IRC
section 7623(c) now reads:
For purposes of this section, the term ‘proceeds’ includes –
(1) Penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional
amounts provided under the internal revenue laws, and
(2) any proceeds arising from laws for which the Internal
Revenue is authorized to administer, enforce, or investigate,
including –
(A) criminal fines and civil forfeitures, and
(B) violations of reporting requirements.125
While the judicial decision held that the civil forfeitures and criminal
fines constitute collected proceeds for awards paid out under Section
7623(b), the revised statutory language broadened the definition of
“proceeds” for awards paid out under both Sections 7623(a) and (b). In
addition to adopting the court’s approach for Section 7623(b), Congress
applied the same approach for Section 7623(a), which was not addressed by
the court. Nevertheless, with the statutory revision and codification of the
broad definition of proceeds, both the legislature and judicial branches were
on board with the change. But what are the implications of this expansive
definition of proceeds?

III. BROAD DEFINITION OF “PROCEEDS COLLECTED”
ADVANCES GOALS OF THE TAX WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM
Recognizing that the tax whistleblower program was established as
an external reporting mechanism allowing employees to report fraudulent
activities to the government in exchange for a reward, the sections below
discuss how the broad definition of proceeds advances the goals of the
123. BIPARTISAN BUDGET ACT OF 2018, PUB. L. NO. 115-123, §132 STAT. 64, 158 (2018).
124. BIPARTISAN BUDGET ACT OF 2018, PUB. L. NO. 115-123, §132 STAT. 64, 158 (2018);
Neiman, supra note 95.
125. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(c) (2019).
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whistleblower program and analyzes whether the broadened definition of
proceeds promotes good tax policy more generally.
A. Goals of the Whistleblower Program
The goals of the tax whistleblower program are to incentivize
whistleblowers to “blow the whistle,” thereby encouraging companies to
develop internal reporting mechanisms to identify compliance problems and
facilitating the IRS enforcements efforts to close the tax gap and increase
federal revenue. The following subparts analyze whether the broadened
definition of “proceeds collected” advances these objectives.
1. Incentive to “Blow the Whistle”
A larger monetary award can incentivize more employees to disclose
insider information to external reporting programs.126 Studies have shown
that a large monetary award (versus a small monetary award) is a stronger
incentive,127 therefore, the IRS whistleblower program’s broad definition of
proceeds encourages more employees to report externally. Admittedly,
financial incentive is not likely to influence the decision of employees who
are motivated primarily by a sense of duty. But the expectation of an award
might influence these individuals to some extent, even if it is not the primary
reason why they decide to blow the whistle. Regardless of the definition of
proceeds, the whistleblower program incentivizes taxpayers to disclose tax
violations. However, the prospect of a larger potential payout with the
broader definition of proceeds incentivizes more employees to report to the
IRS. Thus, the broad definition of proceeds, which increases the award
payout, encourages more employees to report directly to the IRS.
By offering a higher award payout, the broad definition of proceeds
does more to encourage ex-spouses, former business partners, and even
individuals facing criminal charges to report on others engaged in unlawful
conduct.128 Unlike employee whistleblowers who are typically motivated by
moral outrage or a sense of duty,129 ex-spouses and former business partners

126. Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s
Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 758 (2014).
127. Justin Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the Internal Compliance World as We
Know it, or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement? Bounty
Hunting Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Provisions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 1023, 1052 (2012).
128. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street
by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, B.Y.U. L. REV. 73, 141 (2012).
129. Alon Faiman, “No One Likes a Tattle Tale,” or Do they? Why the Implementation of a
Broad Definition of “Collected Proceeds” Under the Tax Whistleblower Program is a Major
Win for Whistleblowers and Taxpayers,” 12 CHARLESTON L. REV. 173, 209–10 (2018).
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who report tax cheats may be “motivated by revenge.”130 Despite this selfserving behavior, ex-spouses and disgruntled business partners still reveal
useful information to the government.131 Similarly, individuals facing
criminal charges will be incentivized to reveal insider information in
exchange for an award.132 But these individuals are more likely to file false
reports to escape criminal prosecution.133 To mitigate risks of such fraudulent
reports, the WO has implemented steps to throw out meritless claims.134 The
whistleblower statute also explicitly reduces or denies the award to
individuals who either initiated the action that resulted in the underpayment
of tax or were criminally convicted for planning such action.135 Consider, for
instance, Bradley Birkenfeld, a former international banker, who was
sentenced to 40 months in prison for his role in a tax evasion case even
though he earned a $104 million whistleblower award.136 Although
Birkenfeld received the largest whistleblower award paid by the IRS, he
could not escape charges for fraud.137
Despite their personal motives, ex-spouses, former business
partners, and alleged criminals may have valuable information for the
government. These individuals will reveal such information to the IRS
regardless of the size of the monetary reward. It does not matter whether the
definition of proceeds is broad or narrow for their purposes. However, the
expectation of a larger reward will further incentivize them to snitch on those
engaged in fraudulent activities. It is a win-win situation for them.
2. Encourages Companies to Build Internal Compliance Mechanisms
By incentivizing more individuals to reveal tax fraud with a larger
payout, the broad definition of proceeds encourages companies to develop
internal reporting mechanisms to identify compliance problems. By
protecting and rewarding individuals, whistleblower laws present risks that
are “too large for all entities, even the smallest, to ignore.”138 As a
consequence, organizations have established internal reporting mechanisms
130. Ladwig, infra note 140, at 90.
Rapp, supra note 128.
132. Jennifer M. Pacella, Bounties for Bad Behavior: Rewarding Culpable Whistleblowers
Under the Dodd-Frank Act and Internal Revenue Code, 17 U. PA. J BUS. L. 345, 372 (2015).
133. Id. at 372.
134. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
136. Debra S. Katz, Emerging Issues in Whistleblower Law and Retaliation, PRAC. LA. 37,
50 (2017).
137. David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blower Awarded $104 Million by I.R.S., NY TIMES (Sept.
11, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/business/whistle-blower-awarded-104million-by-irs.html.
138. Patrick S. Coffey, Managing the Threat of Whistleblower Claims, WIS. LAW. 30, 30
(2015).
131
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to address workplace concerns.139 Because employees who “blow the
whistle” are usually motivated by a sense of moral duty, they feel obligated
to report internally to preserve the employer-employee relationship.140 With
the recent implementation of retaliatory protection under the Taxpayer First
Act, prohibiting employers from discharging, harassing, demoting,
suspending, or discriminating against an employee who lawfully discloses
information to the government or employer about underpayment of taxes or
violations of the internal revenue laws, employees are even more likely to
report to the internal compliance program.141 However, employers who still
retaliate by seeking revenge or striking back at the employee for complaining
about the alleged illegal act might push employees to file claims with the
WO.142 Employees are essentially committing a “career suicide” and
forgoing career opportunities143 when fraud is spread throughout the
corporation and “information is not . . . well received or acted upon.”144 With
the broadened definition of proceeds promising a larger award in exchange
for information on illegal acts, the companies fear more disclosures of tax
fraud and will feel more pressure to investigate fraudulent misconduct. The
threat that misconduct could be revealed to the government will increase
compliant behavior. Internal compliance issues might even be rectified
without the need for an IRS enforcement action.
3. Facilitating IRS Enforcement Efforts
The broad definition of “proceeds” aids the IRS in enforcing
compliance. In the past decade, the IRS funding has been cut by at least
twenty-five percent.145 This has resulted in reduced tax enforcement—the
“number of individual audits fell forty-two percent between 2010 and
2017.”146 With the growing workload and limited resources, the IRS has been
unable to “detect and address noncompliance” and “maximize revenue
collection.”147 Regardless of whether proceeds are defined narrowly or
139. Id.
140. Christine A. Ladwig, A Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Triple Win Scenario: The
Joint Benefit of an Internal-External Reporting Alliance for Corporations, Whistleblowers
and Government, 27 MIDWEST L.J. 79, 87 (2017).
141. Taxpayer First Act, Pub. L. No. 116-25, 133 Stat. 981, 998–99 (2019). President Trump
signed the Taxpayer First Act providing protection from retaliation in July of 2019.
142. Patricia A. Wise, Understanding and Preventing Workplace Retaliation, Chapter 1:
Defining Retaliation in the Workplace (2004).
143. Pacella, supra note 126, at 754.
144. Ladwig, supra note 140, at 89.
145. Scott Horsley, On Tax Day, The IRS is Short of Money, NPR (April 15, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/15/713411490/on-tax-day-the-irs-is-short-of-money.
146. Id.
147. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, at 3 (2011) 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/irs_tas_arc_2011_vol_1.pdf.
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broadly, the whistleblower program encourages informants to provide
information to the IRS, making it easier for the agency to detect
noncompliance and target noncompliant taxpayers. But the incentive of a
larger award will attract more whistleblowers, allowing the IRS to discover
more noncompliance and investigate more fraudulent activities that would
otherwise go undetected. In sum, the broader definition of “proceeds” offers
a larger award, which encourages more taxpayers to aid the IRS, thereby
providing more assistance for the IRS’s efforts to reduce noncompliance and
tax fraud.
4. Closing the Tax Gap and Increasing the Federal Revenue
By doing more to improve the IRS enforcement efforts and
encourage increased compliance, the broad definition of proceeds minimizes
the gap between tax paid and tax owed,148 thereby increasing the federal
revenue. The IRS has estimated the annual tax gap to be somewhere between
$400–500 billion.149 By offering a larger monetary prize, the IRS encourages
more whistleblowers to come forward with information that the IRS might
otherwise not have detected with its limited resources.150 By pursuing more
noncompliant taxpayers and operating as a deterrence for tax fraud, the
whistleblower program can close the tax gap even more.151 This reduction in
the size of the tax gap results in more revenue collected. The whistleblower
program helps the government collect more of the money owed by taxpayers,
and when the government collects a larger percentage of the money owed as
a result of a broader definition of proceeds that incentivizes more taxpayers
to blow the whistle, the government is better able to do whatever it
determines is necessary.
Larger money payouts, as a result of the broad definition of proceeds
for the purposes of determining the award, do not deplete the collected
taxes.152 Although the whistleblower program may cost government more
money in an individual case by offering as much as thirty percent of the total
collected proceeds in awards, bigger award payouts encourage more
whistleblowers to come forward, resulting in the discovery of more
noncompliant taxpayers. This results in more whistleblower cases; therefore,
larger awards lead to more tax collections in the aggregate even if each case
ends up bringing in slightly less money. The revelation of more information
to the IRS will also reduce the agency’s costs of detecting noncompliance.
148. Faiman, supra note 129, at 207–08.
149. TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011-2013, at 1 (2019), 2019 IRS PUB. 5364,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5364.pdf.
150. Davis-Nozemack & Webber, supra notes 28–31.
151. Carman, supra note 26, at 155.
152. Id. at 170.
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The IRS may have to pay a larger sum to the whistleblower as an award, but
it simultaneously saves money spent on the detection of noncompliance.
Thus, the broad definition of proceeds allows the IRS to detect more
noncompliance, increasing overall revenue collected.
B. Broad Definition of Proceeds Promotes Tax Policy Norms
The preceding section establishes how the broad definition of
proceeds increases the efficacy of the tax whistleblower program. But how
does the broad definition of proceeds affect the goals of the tax system? The
primary purpose of the tax system is to “facilitate the collection of revenue”
to ensure stability in “the nation’s fiscal health and its social well being.”153
To further evaluate whether the broad definition of proceeds is a good public
policy that advances the objectives of the tax system, three tax policy norms–
neutrality, fairness, and simplicity–are discussed below.154
1. Deviation from Neutrality is Inevitable
The broad definition of proceeds promotes the goals of the
whistleblower program by changing the behavior of taxpayers; hence, nonneutrality is inevitable. The tax system maintains neutrality by ensuring that
tax considerations do not drive economic decisions of taxpayers.155 The
objective is to raise revenue for government spending and promote economic
growth without distorting the behavior of taxpayers.156 Yet the whistleblower
program, even with a narrow definition of proceeds, incentivizes
whistleblowers to report underpayments of tax and violations of the internal
revenue code. It promotes the goals of the tax system by facilitating revenue
collection and raising federal revenue. However, the expectation of a larger
award as a result of a broader definition of proceeds incentivizes taxpayers
who were previously not incentivized to disclose noncompliance. Fearing
this surge in disclosure of unlawful misconduct, previously noncompliant
taxpayers will be more inclined to pay all the taxes owed rather than face a
government action or investigation. Such distortions in behavior lessen
neutrality in the tax system. However, this deviation from a neutral tax
system does promote a good public policy.
Neutrality is a non-issue if the goal of the policymakers is to create
positive externalities by changing the behavior of taxpayers. As mentioned
153. Leo P. Martinez, The Trouble with Taxes: Fairness, Tax Policy, and the Constitution,
31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 415–16 (2004).
154. STEPHANIE HUNTER MCMAHON, PRINCIPLES OF TAX POLICY 102–03 (2018) (discussing
the basic principles of tax policy).
155. David Hasen, Tax Neutrality and Tax Amenities, 12 FLA. TAX. REV. 57, 60 (2012).
156. Jason Furman, The Concept of Neutrality in Tax Policy (April 15, 2008),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0415_tax-_neutrality_furman1.pdf; Martinez, supra note 153, at 415.
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above, the expanded interpretation of proceeds encourages more taxpayers
to blow the whistle and reveal fraudulent misconduct to the government,
thereby increasing compliance. This distortion in the behavior of taxpayers
leaves the government better-off. With the aid of whistleblowers, the
government can recover unpaid taxes and raise revenue for its spending. The
government will have additional funds to invest in social welfare, advancing
a good public policy. Therefore, any additional deviation from neutrality
with the expanded definition of proceeds is justified in light of the increased
well-being of society.
2. Improvement in Tax Fairness Norms
The new definition of “proceeds collected” is a fair tax policy even
if it deviates from a neutral tax system. The tax fairness principle consists of
two norms: vertical and horizontal equity.157 Vertical equity requires tax
obligations to be proportional to income.158 Horizontal equity ascertains that
two alike taxpayers in a similar situation have the same tax liabilities.159
Regardless of the definition of “proceeds collected” for the purposes of
determining the whistleblower award, the tax whistleblower program detects
underpayments of taxes and ensures that taxpayers bear their share of the tax
burden. For example, if an informant discloses the unlawful acts of wealthy
individuals who underpay their taxes, then the whistleblower program can
require them to pay tax restitution, criminal fines and civil forfeitures. The
whistleblower program prevents wealthy individuals from undermining the
progressivity of the system. By requiring such taxpayers to carry a larger
burden, the program attempts to achieve fairness via vertical equity.160
Similarly, if a taxpayer who carries the same tax burden as another underpays
her taxes, then the program can impose penalties and fines to reach fairness
by way of horizontal equity. With the recent change in the definition of
proceeds to include criminal fines and civil forfeitures, the whistleblower
program can increase fairness in the tax system. By offering a larger financial
incentive, the program can attract more whistleblowers and target more
taxpayers engaged in illegal conduct. By facilitating the IRS’s enforcement
efforts, the program can prevent more taxpayers from unfairly paying less
than their share of burden and reduce the tax gap, advancing fairness in the
tax system.

157. Richard J. Wood, Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Tax Fairness, 36 SETON HALL L.
REV. 421, 422 (2006).
158. Ira K. Lindsay, Tax Fairness by Convention: A Defense of Horizontal Equity, 19 FLA.
TAX REV. 79, 81 (2016).
159. Cara Griffith, Tax Policy in an Age of Cynicism, 45 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 577, 582 (2019).
160. Martinez, supra note 153, at 422.
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3. Simplification Adds More Complexity
The IRC section 7623(c) clarifies the definition of proceeds for the
purposes of determining the whistleblower award, but it also adds to the
complexity of the law. Tax policy should be simple.161 Along with being
easily enforceable, it should “avoid excessive complexity.”162 A clear
definition of proceeds, regardless of whether it is narrow or broad, simplifies
the application of the whistleblower statute. Congress put an end to the
differing interpretations of the term with the explicit inclusion of criminal
fines, civil forfeitures and penalties for the violations of reporting
requirements in the total proceeds collected. Nevertheless, the inclusion of
both Title 26 and non-Title 26 fines and penalties adds a layer of complexity.
Leaving the WO to figure out how to calculate the awards with both
Title 26 and non-Title 26 claims, the new definition of proceeds causes
complexity in the whistleblower program. Before 2018, the IRS simply
closed claims with no “Title 26 Collected Proceeds.”163 After the 2018
amendments, the IRS had to keep such claims open in the event non-Title 26
amounts were collected, resulting in the issuance of a whistleblower award.
For example, in 2018, the WO undertook the review of “29,198 open claims
for potential non-Title 26 proceeds.”164 Reviewing Title 26 and non-Title 26
claims individually delayed the claims process, as proceeds were probably
collected at different times. Therefore, in 2019, as a response to the BBA of
2018, the WO modified Form 11369.165 Each taxpayer involved in the
investigation of the whistleblower’s claim was required to submit Form
11369, along with a narrative, to assist the WO in determining the extent of
the contributions made by the whistleblower’s information.166 The narrative
specifically provides details on “how the whistleblower’s information was
used in any IRS investigation; regardless of whether the laws administered,
enforced, or investigated are outside of Title 26.”167 Because the WO makes

161. See generally Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS.
L. REV. 1267 (1990).
162. Id.
163. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 17
(2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2018.pdf.
164. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 6 (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2019.pdf.
165. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FY 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 6 (2020),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p5241--2020.pdf
166. I.R.M. 25.2.1.5.5 (April 29, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-002001#idm140291679327216. Taxpayers affected by the IRS investigation “are relevant to a
whistleblower submission when: (a) the whistleblower identifies the taxpayers in the claim;
or (b) the whistleblower information is considered in a civil, criminal, or judicial proceeding
involving a taxpayer other than the taxpayer(s) identified in the claim(s).”
167. Id.
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an award determination upon the receipt of Form 11369,168 it can potentially
review both Title 26 and non-Title 26 claims simultaneously. Examining
whether the modifications in Form 11369 have reduced the complexity of
the new procedure (requiring the WO to evaluate both Title 26 and non-Title
26 claims) is beyond the scope of this note. But these updates in the
whistleblower claims process demonstrate the impact of the broader
definition of proceeds. Amending its procedures to reflect the changes in the
law, the WO is attempting to maintain a simple tax system. Since this is a
new practice, there is not enough data to determine whether the WO has been
successful in evaluating both Title 26 and non-Title 26 claims for award
determinations.
***
Given the foregoing discussion, the broad definition of proceeds
contributes to the goals of the whistleblower program and attempts to
advance the tax policy norms to a certain degree. However, the broad
definition of proceeds purely on its own is not enough to reach the full
potential of the whistleblower program.

IV. EXPANDING DEFINITION OF PROCEEDS IS PROGRESS
BUT NOT ENOUGH
The new definition of proceeds increases the impact of the
whistleblower program; however, it also reveals certain issues that cannot be
resolved with a mere financial incentive. To comprehensively advance the
goals of the whistleblower program, additional steps must be taken to create
appropriate incentives for whistleblowers influenced by non-monetary
motivations and companies with ineffective internal compliance
mechanisms.
A. More Should be Done to Incentivize Whistleblowers and Encourage
Compliance
1. Addressing Heterogeneous Motivations
The expanded definition of proceeds does not respond to
heterogeneous motivations. It incentivizes informants who are entirely, or at
least partly motivated by money. Such individuals may be employees, exspouses, former business partners, or alleged criminals.169 These same
individuals might still have other motivations–sense of duty, moral outrage,
revenge, or higher likelihood of escaping criminal prosecution.170 Therefore,
prospective whistleblowers, especially employees who feel obligated to
168. I.R.M. 22.2.2.5.1. (April 26, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-002-002.
169. Supra note 128–130 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 129, 130, 132 and accompanying text.
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disclose noncompliance out of a sense of duty, need more than just a
financial incentive. They are certainly swayed by the monetary award,171
even if just slightly, but another non-monetary benefit might give them the
final push to reach out to the IRS whistleblower program. Rather than
reporting to potentially inadequate internal compliance programs, these
informants will reach out to the external whistleblower program. Thus, tax
policymakers need to implement additional incentives to attract
whistleblowers with heterogeneous motivations in order to detect more
noncompliance.
2. Improving Internal Compliance Mechanisms
The threat of whistleblower programs has prompted companies to
establish internal compliance mechanisms,172 however, their effectiveness is
questionable. Companies with widespread fraud might retaliate against
employees and not act upon the reported information.173 Internal reporting
might be entirely ineffective if the corporate authorities conduct no
investigation whatsoever.174 Admittedly, whistleblowers can report to an
external reporting program when internal reporting fails or is “not an
option.”175 But this will deplete the IRS’s limited resources and funding.176
Therefore, the tax whistleblower program needs to enact a policy that forces
these companies to implement an effective internal compliance program. If
internal reporting compliance programs are reliable, the whistleblower
program will no longer need to expend its resources on corporate noncompliance. With companies rectifying internal problems, the whistleblower
programs can reduce the tax gap even more and raise revenue. As of right
now, the tax whistleblower program prompts companies to establish an
internal reporting mechanism, but it needs to push these companies to
conduct investigations and actually mitigate fraud.
B. Recommendations to Further Goals of the Tax Whistleblower
Program
1. Responding to Heterogeneous Motivations: Education and Praise
Education can incentivize taxpayers with heterogeneous motivations
to reveal tax fraud. The notion of tax morale, also known as “internal
motivations,” is often used to depict how “tax compliance is affected by
(social and personal) norms such as those regarding procedural justice, trust,
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Pacella, supra note 132.
See supra notes 138, 140.
Ladwig, supra note 140.
Id. at 89–90.
Id. at 89.
See supra note 145–147.
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belief in the legitimacy of the government, reciprocity, altruism, and
identification with the group.”177 Making taxpayers feel more in “control of
their tax situation,” education heightens tax morale by “strengthening
feelings of identity, reciprocity, fairness, [and] procedural justice.” 178
Educating taxpayers about the impact of the tax whistleblower program on
the tax gap and federal revenue is one way to encourage them to disclose tax
violations. The IRS can work with tax experts to spread knowledge, create
teaching programs via educational institutions, or publish articles on its
website.179￼ Through communication, the IRS can inform the public about
the contributions of the whistleblower program to social welfare. It can
emphasize on the role of whistleblowers in raising revenue, which ultimately
helps the country and its citizens. With the collection of more taxes, the
government can use funds where they are deemed necessary, and even
eventually lower tax rates. Understanding that there is more to the
whistleblower program than just a monetary award, taxpayers will be more
inclined to snitch on others to strengthen fairness and procedural justice.
Prospective whistleblowers, with knowledge of the program, will
feel obliged to report to the IRS. Prompting taxpayers to disclose tax
violations has been a challenge for the whistleblower program. Merely
having knowledge about the social impact of the whistleblower program
might not be sufficient to encourage individuals to disclose information
about their personal or professional connections. But higher education
correlates with higher tax morale.180 Therefore, education heightens internal
motivation of prospective whistleblowers to aid the government in
improving the country. All in all, education is a significant tool that urges
individuals with heterogeneous motivations to reveal tax violations.
Praise is another method that can mitigate the impact of
heterogeneous motivations on the behavior of prospective whistleblowers.
Praise is an indication of approval.181 Tax policymakers use praise by
providing a positive incentive,182 in the form of a financial award, to
whistleblowers. This incentive is given out to encourage more taxpayers to
file whistleblower claims with the IRS. It “increases a certain kind of
behavior.”183 It is distinguishable from a reward that is also given out as a
result of certain behavior, but only if the recipient “deserves to receive it.”184
177. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance: Recommendations
for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 601–02 (2007).
178. Id. at 629.
179. Id. at 629–30.
180. Id. at 629–31.
181. Ezra Goldschlager, Praise and the Law, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353, 357 (2016).
182. Id. at 357.
183. Id. at 359.
184. Id. at 357.
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The IRS should use incentive and reward payouts congruently. In addition
to offering the money payment, it should distribute rewards to
whistleblowers in the form of a “praise” to show that they are deserving
recipients. Legal praise is valuable.185 In military, medals are given to
soldiers for acts of valor.186 This form of praise has substantial effect on
soldiers because it encourages them to act gallantly in future.187 Similarly,
the IRS can single out whistleblowers for contributing to social welfare and
treat them as heroes. Openly praising whistleblowers on the IRS website, in
published articles and even in news media, the IRS can turn the spotlight on
the contributions made by these individuals in minimizing tax gap and
raising revenue for the betterment of society. Because society respects heroes
for having a good moral character,188 public will be more accepting of
whistleblowers if they are considered heroes. Given this public acceptance,
prospective whistleblowers will feel more inclined to report tax fraud to the
IRS without being treated as “snitches.”
The whistleblower award might cheapen the notion of heroism.189
Money payments are external incentives that can certainly diminish internal
motivation of taxpayers to behave a certain way.190 It changes the behavior
of individuals who are entirely or partly motivated by money. But it does
compensate those who jeopardize their career by disclosing fraud.191
Employees who lose their jobs might still be able to maintain financial
stability with this award. On the other hand, in cases where individuals have
heterogeneous motivations, it might not be enough to convince them to
disclose tax violations to the IRS. These individuals might want money, but
are probably afraid to jeopardize their career or incite public backlash.192 Or
they are simply more motivated by sense of duty and moral outrage.193 In
these situations, praise is a tool that can encourage individuals to reach out
to the IRS. Praise is more “likely to imply an acknowledgement of intrinsic
motivation” with its recognition of good behavior.194 Whistleblowers will
overlook the concerns mentioned above if they are treated as heroes.
Therefore, money is as important as praise when it comes to incentivizing
and rewarding whistleblowers. Similar to how Good Samaritan laws inject
financial incentive (lower risk of tort liability) and promote voluntary
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 365.
Id.
Goldschlager, supra note 181, at 365.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 370.
See supra note 142–144.
See supra note 142–144.
See supra note 129.
Goldschlager, supra note 181, at 373, 375.
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heroism,195 the whistleblower award can compensate whistleblowers for
jeopardizing their career and praise them for reporting tax fraud. Prospective
whistleblowers are putting a lot at stake and risking personal and
professional relationships; thus, these individuals should be praised for their
courage regardless of the monetary award.
2. Improving Internal Compliance Mechanisms: Penalties
Penalties force taxpayers to comply with tax law,196 so the IRS
should impose penalties on companies with ineffective internal reporting
programs. Taxpayers abide by the law when legal sanctions cost more than
compliance.197 Legal sanctions, by way of civil and criminal penalties,
promote compliance.198 Reviewing the impact of different forms of penalties
is beyond the scope of this note. But the possibility of a penalty that is costlier
than compliance will drive these companies to establish an effective internal
reporting mechanism. Since most whistleblowers are intrinsically motivated
by a sense of duty, they will choose the effective internal reporting
mechanism (if available) over an external whistleblower program.199
Therefore, to ensure that employee complaints are effectively investigated
and rectified, the whistleblower program should specifically impose
penalties on companies with unreliable internal reporting structures.
If an internal risk management structure is more costly than
compliance, then companies might prefer to pay tax penalties. But this
strategy can jeopardize a company’s public image. Legal action for
noncompliance comes with negative publicity.200 Putting company’s
reputation at stake, legal penalties can cause more than just monetary
damage. Therefore, penalties are a valuable tool. The IRS should consider
imposing penalties on companies with inadequate internal reporting
mechanisms.

V. CONCLUSION
The new definition of proceeds, including criminal fines and civil
forfeitures, advances the goals of the tax whistleblower program. By
incentivizing whistleblowers to disclose unlawful activities committed by
taxpayers in exchange for a substantial financial gain, the whistleblower
program is aiding the IRS with its enforcement actions, thereby helping to
195. Id. at 377–78.
196. Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 111
(2009).
197. Id. at 111–12.
198. Id. at 114, 122.
199. Ladwig, supra note 140.
200. Ladwig, supra note 140.
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close the tax gap and raise federal revenue. After the Bipartisan Budget Act
of 2018, the whistleblower award is determined based on total proceeds
collected (i.e., including criminal fines and civil forfeitures), increasing the
amount of award. The prospect of a significant monetary payment has
incentivized more taxpayers to reveal tax violations to the IRS. Fearing
increased disclosures, companies have built internal compliance
mechanisms even if the effectiveness of these internal risk management
structures is questionable. With more taxpayers partaking in the
whistleblower program, the IRS can detect and address more noncompliance, raising more revenue.
The expanded definition of proceeds affects tax policy norms. The
new definition of proceeds changes the behavior of taxpayer by incentivizing
them to disclose tax fraud in exchange for a larger sum of money. This
deviation from tax neutrality is justified given the contributions of the
whistleblower program in advancing social good. Having more
whistleblowers aid the IRS in ensuring that taxpayers carry their share of tax
burden, the new definition of proceeds attempts to promote tax fairness. It,
however, does add complexity to the whistleblower program by requiring
the WO to review both Title 26 and non-Title 26 claims.
Because the definition of proceeds on its own cannot address certain
problems, the whistleblower program needs to take additional steps to
increase its effectiveness. This note raises two issues that cannot be rectified
with a change in the definition of proceeds: incentivizing prospective
whistleblowers with heterogeneous motivations and encouraging companies
to maintain an effective internal reporting mechanism. This note provides
some direction for the whistleblower program to devise strategies that can
continue to develop and expand its efficacy. However, additional research
and analysis is necessary for the development of these proposals.

